3 - 1999
Germany and the War in Kosovo
The Churches and the War in Kosovo
The Unambiguous Commandment of God and the Ambiguity of Rational Judgement
by Hermann Barth
What can a church do when its members have diametrically opposed opinions about an important issue of war and peace, yet the public hopes for orientation from the church? Hermann Barth took up the issue of unambiguous divine commandment and differing judgements on the part of Christians concerning the forms of sensible involvement in working for peace in a speech in Magdeburg on 20 June 1999.
Due to the subject matter, political reason - and therefore also the fallibility of political reason - will often be mentioned in what I have to say. So as not to produce a completely distorted impression, I want to say at least one thing before I start. The churches’ and Christians’ primary work for peace is prayer, because this cannot be delegated. The hymns of the Pentecost season give plenty of instruction here. For my taste the following verse does this most splendidly: But to everything there is a season. There is a time to pray and there is a time to think. Now it’s thinking’s turn, reflection about what churches and Christians have to say about the war in Kosovo.
Common Premises and Attitudes
Slobodan Milosevic is a despot. Since at least ten years he is known to be someone who pursues an agressive greater-Serbian policy, even over dead bodies. The international community cannot and must not accept violations of human rights of this kind and of these dimensions without taking action. These stand in blatant opposition to God’s commandment. According to the will of God they should not happen.
The military action of NATO against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia had the character of a humanitarian intervention. It is not possible to name any geostrategic or economic interests of the USA and the other NATO members that under the guise of moral justification could have been the basis for the use of military force.
There is a argumentative difference between the whether and the how of the use of military force. Criticism of NATO’s conduct of the war does not automatically mean that the military option as a whole is discredited. The military action of NATO in Yugoslavia is determined above all by two considerations - that loss of human life on the NATO side must be kept as low as possible in order not to endanger approval by the democratic public at home and, second, that the superiority in arms technology would make the decisive difference in the end.
But could it be that the idea of a humanitarian intervention that can largely do without the readiness to invest one’s life for the neighbour far away, and which can be precisely, cleanly and successfully carried out through superior technology alone proves to be an illusion? Could it perhaps even be that the Kosovo War destroys the magic and becomes a kind of ’twilight of the gods’ of the highly modern and super-expensive western military machinery?
Morals always can reach for weapons only with embarrassment. This leads almost inevitably to asymmetry and an optical illusion in the awareness of the actions of both warring parties in the war in Kosovo.
I distrust all those who are all too sure of their judgement about the ethics of peace in the current debate about the war in Kosovo. It is not a sign of intellectual or moral weakness to admit that one wavers in his judgement again and again and is also able to appreciate the arguments for other positions.
There is a real danger in continuing the once-chosen course of argument only or above all because one cannot admit to having chosen the wrong direction. Am I free to accept myself as a person capable of error and to turn my thoughts around, or am I damned to hold to the chosen path because I would otherwise no longer be sure of myself?
The Voice of the Churches and the Christians
The EKD received very many letters concerning the war in Kosovo. Their tone was mainly that "just goals cannot be pursued by unjust means. The Gospel commands us to abstain from the use of force of arms. When will the EKD finally take a position with clear words against the policy of NATO and the federal government?" These letters are an index of how deeply among Christians the pacifist option continues to be rooted. The rejection in principle of the use of military force is seldom met in the utterances of representativ and leadership bodies of the churches. However, it does exist, most recently in the resolution of the Council of Bishops of the Evangelical Methodist Church at a global level: violence and war are incompatible with the Spirit of Christ, and thus both the ethnic cleansing in Kosovo as well as the NATO bombardment are condemned.
The statements of the Orthodox churches require long-term attention and deeper study. They cannot be lumped together and we are properly warned to pay careful attention to the nuances. But in my opinion there is much in these statements that is irritating and frightening: the close alliance between church and nation, the invoking of the "sacred ground" of their own people, the reserve over against the intellectual approach of human rights or the fear of Moslem expansion bordering on paranoia.
For what purpose were there decades of theological dialogue with various Orthodox churches? What good is the community with the Orthodox churches in the Conference of European Churches and in the World Council of Churches? A dialogue in which one does not demand anything of the other will be suffocated by its own untruthfulness.
Judging the Ethics of Peace
In the Protestant church a broad consensus on the ethics of peace developed after the East-West confrontation was overcome. It is expressed in the statement of the EKD Synod about the responsibilty for peace from November 1993 and in the contribution of the Council of the EKD "Steps on the Way of Peace. Orientation Points for the Ethics and Politics of Peace" of February 1994. The consensus reached at that time proved itself as a basis for ethical reflection and statements about the war in Kosovo. Here two significant decisions should be noted in particular.
In contrast to a radically pacifist position, the use of military force is recognized as ultima ratio, that is, the final means according to the measure of the force exercised. This includes the task of watching to ensure that the use of military force really remains the borderline case. That in the situation existing in March 1999 the borderline case actually was reached is not an undisputed fact.
The critics of the NATO decision assert that the instruments of coercion below the threshold of the use of military force were by no means exhausted. Particularly the embargo measures were applied only half-heartedly. But who would seriously believe that a despot like Milosevic, who apparently survived the heavy and lasting damage of the air war, could be defeated by embargo measures? Besides, one may not slip around the problem that embargo measures need the infliction of a tangible wound to be effective. These hit sooner or later the civilian population, not least children, old and sick people.
NATO understands its military action against Yugoslavia as emergency help on behalf of the ethnic Albanian population in Kosovo, that is, as humanitarian intervention. Here is in principle the old conflict between national sovereignty on the one hand and universal respect for humanity on the other. This conflict was not seriously considered from an historical point of view yet in actual fact resolved, and in favor of the sovereignty of the individual state. Every single country could thus claim to decide politically which definition of respect for humanity and which law should apply within its boundaries and for its actions.
Within the framework of a peaceful international order under the rule of law, a sovereignty understood in this way can no longer be accepted without reservation. It is the duty of the world’s peoples to contribute to the recognition and enforcement of human rights and therefore to accord protection and aid to the victims of oppression and violence. This insight is a essential contribution to the strengthening of a peaceful international order.
Before a humanitarian intervention turns to the use of military force as ultima ratio thus raising the level of military force already in use it must be carefully investigated whether the means are likely to actually achieve what they are meant to achieve. Here quite sober calculation is joined to the moral argumentation.
This is the second significant point linked to the consensus on the ethics of peace reached in 1993/94. The moral argument alone is not enough. With the force of an unconditional imperative and stirring emotions, it is in danger of ignoring reality. The "Orientation Points" of the Council of the EKD from 1994 have therefore made careful considerations with regard to humanitarian interventions: "Humanitarian viewpoints" - it states - "can only justify an intervention with military instruments of coercion when
- the decision about such intervention, which may not be left up to the sovereignty of individual states, is made in the framework and according to the rules of the United Nations,
- the policy within the framework of protection or re-establishment of a legally constituted peaceful order has clearly declared goals,
- the chances for success, measured on the goals, are soberly estimated, and
- the way such an intervention can be ended is thought of from the beginning."
"On the other hand, doubts remain whether in the actual condition of the organization of the United Nations orientation by the principles and rules of the Charter are ensured in all cases - not least in view of the permanent members of the Security Council, who can block with their veto every decision and every action which pertains to themselves or to their interests. In the further development of the present structures of the peaceful international order it will be necessary to examine in which ways not only in the present phase of transition - for reasons of efficiency - but also in the overall order later - for reasons of a necessary division of power - regional systems of collective security can step in beside the United Nations, as in the Charter."
Ever since NATO has begun to militarily intervene, the goals named by the politicians have changed. The signing of the agreement of Rambouillet on the part of Yugoslavia has today largely receded into the background. There was no success in hindering further expulsion from Kosovo. On the contrary, Yugoslavia used the military action of NATO to proceed with the expulsions more quickly and more brutally than before. Only the larger goal, of not accepting an ethnic cleansing of Kosovo and bringing about a situation in which the ethnic Albanian population of Kosovo can live in their homeland in peace and with human rights safeguarded, remained.
Orientation along the significant decisions and criteria described does not lead everyone finally to the same result. But for Protestant ethics that is not even necessary. The remaining dissension is easier to bear because it does not have the character of a destructive conflict. Unlike in the controversies about the ethics of peace in past decades, in the self-understanding of the participants, faith and unbelief, discipleship and denial of Christ do not face each other in the different positions. On the ground of common ethical convictions about peace the controversies are all concerned with appraisals of political reason. Was in this situation the borderline case of the ultima ratio present? Was an insistence on an intervention within the framework and according to the rules of the United Nation possible and allowable? Did the politicians have goals that were clear enough for the use of military force? Were the chances of success measured on the goals estimated soberly enough? Is there enough clarity about how the intervention can be ended? However much uniform answers to these questions are sought, also among Christians, it is equally true that, as present experience teaches, Christians can with good reasons give differing answers to these questions.
Hermann Barth is vice president in the church offices of the Evangelical Church in Germany (EKD). The speech was published in "epd Dokumentation", 26a/99, by the Evangelische Pressedienst (Protestant press services). This is a shortened form trasnlated for publishing in this issue.