3 -1999

Germany and the War in Kosovo

Costly Peace

Lessons from the War in Kosovo

by Renate Wilke-Launer

The war in Kosovo has left many people in Germany feeling deeply uncertain. The hope that after the end of the East-West confrontation a time of peace would dawn, at least in Europe, has not been fulfilled. This gives cause for renewed reflection upon the shaping of international relations and German foreign policy.

"This cannot go on. This must be stopped. Now. ... We had taken far too long to realize it." Many Europeans have felt and thought like the writer Michael Ignatieff in the past months. This is the only explanation for the fact that NATO bombarded Milosevic’s Yugoslavia and the majority of the population accepted this war. There were neither storms of protest nor enthusiasm for the war. Only the large number of viewers of the news and special programs and the great readiness to make donations showed how much this war, as an example, occupied the minds of the Germans.

The passionate plea of Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer and his strategic skill contributed a great deal to acceptance in Germany of the lack of authorization by the UN Security Council and of the self-mandating of NATO. He was also sensitive enough to let himself be corrected when with the appeal to "never again Auschwitz" he clearly went too far. On the other hand, the emotional confession of Defense Secretary Rudolf Scharping quickly seemed embarrassing. Publicly demonstrated opposition on principle, such as during the Easter marches or at the special party conference of the Greens, for example, remained at a minimum and mostly discredited itself, as when marching side-by-side with Serbian nationalists, presenting crude conspiracy theories or elevating simple assumptions to moral principles.

The dispute about this war did not take place in parliament but in the media. Because it was clear to all involved that here new ground was being broken, that this war had to be judged through controversy but that it was not suitable for games of moral oneupmanship, a serious debate developed. The dilemma was great enough so that the boundaries and fences of the present political "camps" were often crossed. And because writers were searching for orientation as much as was the public, a real learning process could take place.

It is not possible to say with certainty whether this war was avoidable. Historians will have to ascertain that. Was it right to dictate an agreement that was fair according to our standards but that was not wanted by either side? Did the NATO sacrifice a possibly effective potential threat by excluding the use of ground forces? Did one include Russia, simultaneously part of the problem and part of the solution, appropriately?

The dynamic of the Rambouillet process can be understood and assessed only against the background of the policy of the West toward what was formerly Yugoslavia. Was this policy, as the American journalist Mark Danner formulated after analyzing many studies, "so full of hesitations, of hypocrisy, half-solutions, compromises and wishful thinking" that Milosevic could repeatedly exploit these weaknesses? If that is true, and much speaks for this view, what would appear to have been a more effective policy? What should one say to Radovan Karadzic’s statement that at the start of the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina less than a thousand soldiers would have been enough to force the Bosnian-Serbian army to capitulate?

If the great moral gesture with which this war was explained is to be believable, then this must be shown in domestic politics as well. The discussion among the NATO countries about the admission of (as few as possible) Kosovar-Albanian refugees was the equivalent of a contest in shabbiness. That Germany did more here than others is only to be valued positively in comparison to the other countries. Granting refugees protection was never a question of pride - which also would have been a lesson learned from history. Even citizens’ private willingness to help was hindered rather than supported by officials. That already before the first KFOR soldier had touched Kosovar ground those driven out were being urged to return at the earliest possible moment shows how far the moral decline in refugee politics has progressed.

Before the NATO attack, a report of the German foreign ministry "about the asylum- and deportation-relevant situation" said that "a deliberate persecution of returning Kosovar-Albanians by organs of the state was not to be reckoned with". Here the double standard is palpable. Joschka Fischer accepted responsibility for this blatant error of judgement and promised improvement. On this basis the reports of the situation in all dictatorships are to be judged in the future.

If the Balkan region is to be stabilized, then generous support must be granted for years. The demand for the prevention of crises and conflicts is so sensible that one scarcely need to repeat it. Evidently the short-mindedness of politics obstructs actions that are actually rational. Even if this will not basically change, there are several things that can be done to recognize developing conflicts and possibly to defuse them early.

Prevention is a demand on the whole of society. It is relatively easy to accuse the foreign ministry of institutional blindness, lack of expertise and false priorities. Blind spots also exist in the awareness on the part of the public. Why was there so seldom talk of the apartheid in Kosovo in the last ten years? Could it be that the Kosovar-Albanians found no lobby among us because the very conservative farming families were felt to be strange and - other than the multi-cultural urban Sarajevo - offered no place for projection? And why was precisely this non- violent protest ignored? Now one has to do with an "army of liberation" in which many Kosovar-Albanians see an avenging angel but which must worry every sober observer.

The present helplessness on all sides also offers a chance: to learn. The NATO has rightly been sharply criticized. Hopefully it has lost its appetite for high-tech arrogance and its language of contempt for humankind. The European Union appears to have understood that a common foreign policy is a serious task, even more so if one wants to push back US-American dominance. The "red-green" federal government must now get serious with the professed aims of conflict prevention and peaceful solution of disputes laid down in their coalition agreement. The public must admit that the reactionary nationalism in the East deserves more attention, no matter how unsavory it is.

For foreign policy on the day after there is enough to do. In the first place it would be fatal to declare the action of the NATO that was not authorized by the Security Council to be an exception to the rule and to proceed with business as usual. It is much more important that the tension between the protection of individual human rights and the principle of sovereignty be made an issue of international politics. Kofi Annan, the strong Secretary-General of the presently weakened United Nations, clearly declared his position in April in front of the UN Commission on Human Rights: "Even though we are an organization of Member States, the rights and ideals the United Nations exists to protect are those of peoples. ... No government has the right to hide behind national sovereignty. ... Whether a persons belongs to the minority or the majority, that person’s human rights and fundamental freedoms are sacred."

First suggestions to close the gaps in regulation with regard to humanitarian intervention are available. Here it is important that the primary responsibility of the UN and of the Security Council is maintained and international law developed further along the lines laid down by the UN Charter and the resolutions passed by the Security Council in years past. The debates of the past weeks show how differently the protection of human rights and the principle of sovereignty are given weight in the world. The action of the NATO was very much criticized in many countries. Viktor Tschernomyrdin cited polls according to which 57% of the Russians took a friendly view of the USA before the beginning of the air attacks but afterwards only 14%. 63% made NATO responsible for the conflict, only 6% Yugoslavia. In Argentina as well, the Latin American country most closely linked with the USA, a poll in May showed that of those questioned more were critical of NATO than of Milosevic.

One may shake one’s head about these results, but foreign policy is well advised to take these voices seriously. On the one hand many Latin American countries, for example, have experience with similarly fine-sounding reasons for partisanship on the part of the USA in their internal conflicts ... partisanship for repressive and reactionary regimes that often were linked with severe violation of human rights. On the other hand it is bitterly noted how much political energy and scarce resources are put into the Kosovo. With his angry word about the war of the rich man in Bosnia-Herzegovina the former UN Secretary-General, Boutros-Ghali, already expressed this feeling several years ago. Among the present wars completely ignored in the world it suffices to remember the one in Angola. According to the UN Coordinator for the humanitarian aid in this country, Francesco Strippoli, since December of last year 950,000 people there have become refugees in their own country. The United Nation’s call for help, however, has up to now produced only relatively modest responses. Should protection of human rights find the support worldwide that it deserves, even in conflict with the principle of sovereignty, then it is not enough to persistently plead for it. The strong powers of the West must do much in order to gain credibility. Human rights do not tolerate double standards.

Renate Wilke-Launer is editor of the magazine "der ueberblick", which concerns itself with questions of ecumenical encounter and international cooperation. Slightly shortened editorial from the magazine "der ueberblick", 2/99.