Too much security, too little peace
Peace policy in a changing world
The new “White Paper on Security Policy and the Future of the Bundeswehr” was presented on 13 July. This foundational document of the German federal government was published in a time of profound security policy upheavals. We are experiencing a renaissance of classical power policy that also includes the use of military means. Conflicts and wars have come back to Europe and occur in its direct neighbourhood: the war in eastern Ukraine is continuing with fluctuating intensity. The spectrum of crisis extends from Afghanistan to North Africa via Iraq and Syria. The great refugee movements of past years have called solidarity of Europeans into question. The “Brexit” referendum clearly demonstrates the fragility of the European Union. The European states must also learn to live with growing terrorist threats from within their societies. Internal and external security is more inseparable than ever. The threat to peace is growing.
Frequently people ask whether the security policies and instruments to which we have become accustomed since the end of the Cold War are still appropriate. In view of this new general situation, reorientation is needed for the means and ends, the possibilities and limits of foreign and security policy action. There are no quick and easy answers to hand. There is a need for intensive discussions about security issues in political circles and civil society, among those with public responsibility and also among the citizens.
A responsible and sustainable policy guided by peace, justice and development also needs ethical orientation. The organisations charged with our churches’ peace-building activities, Protestant pastoral care in the armed forces, and the Evangelical Church in Germany (EKD) as a whole, wish to make their contribution to this orientation.
1. The White Paper emerged out of a broad-based discussion process. The EKD and its various organisations took part in this process: both as dialogue partners in overarching event formats and also with its own contributions and events. The White Paper now offers a summary of different perspectives: it deals with elements of security and defence policy, along with the review process of the Foreign Office and contributions from business and civil society. We have also detected basic concerns of Protestant ethics, such as the orientation to the international legal order and to sustainable development. The breadth of analysis and wideness of its horizon are impressive and forward-looking. The White Paper is fundamentally correct in claiming to offer a comprehensive approach.
2. According to the principles of Protestant peace ethics, “just peace” is the key and guiding concept of security policy, connecting as it does peace and law, justice and security. Conceptuality helps to define decisions on goals and orientation for action. The striking thing is that the key concept of peace is largely missing in the White Paper. Instead, the predominant concepts are threat, security and resilience. We ask whether security policy is even possible without the orienting power of a positive and constructive vision like that of “just peace”.
Peace and security must be anchored in the respective societies, in Germany, in Europe and worldwide. That requires building up trust, a nonviolent balance of interests and the vision of a peace that can thrive when hardship is eased, freedom fostered and cultural diversity enabled. This is an entry point for one point of criticism of the 2016 White Paper from the angle of Protestant ethics.
While the White Paper rightly stresses that security is more than the absence of war it is particularly concerned “to improve the conditions of human coexistence in a sustainable manner and to protect and strengthen human rights norms” (White Paper, 1.1, p. 22). Further, with an eye to the UN‘s Agenda 2030 it points out that sustainable development, fighting poverty and hunger and protecting our natural environment are fundamental for peace and security in the world (4.1, p. 62). We would like to see a greater depth of analysis relative to the social and economic asymmetries of globalisation. Peace policy needs practical models for eliminating these asymmetries that spawn violence.
3. The comprehensive approach names human security and development as the highest goals of political action. These goals give rise to the many different instruments of German security policy. The White Paper gives priority to the early recognition of crises, conflict prevention and civilian post-crisis rehabilitation and assistance. It says that in order to avoid, contain and end the use of force, primarily diplomatic means should be employed. According to the basic approach of the White Paper, the Bundeswehr is only one of many possible instruments. However, in relation to political practice, the White Paper concentrates entirely on the contribution of the armed forces, which is contrary to the requirements of a comprehensive approach. It is then a matter of more personnel, more and better armaments and equipment, more financial resources – and a change of trend in the development of the armed forces.
This corresponds to the approach of a White Paper. However, the impression arises that in an emergency, the prime instrument of German security policy would be the Bundeswehr, without having to at least symmetrically strengthen the other, non-military instruments that have priority claims. This deficiency becomes clearest with the demand for a long-term rise in the defence budget to two percent of GDP (4.2, p. 67), while other instruments are only to be financed and resource “on a sustainable basis” (p. 138). Since Germany has for many years missed the voluntary target of allocating 0.7% of GDP for development cooperation, the clear concentration on military instruments must be rated critically, not just conceptually but also financially. For the sake of the government’s own credibility, concrete and substantive statements seem to be required about the way in which non-military instruments could be given a considerable boost both regarding finances and personnel.
4. “The commitment and aims of German governance … to promote peace” (p. 24) is only possible in the context of an international legal order. The White Paper names “maintaining the rules-based order on the basis of international law” (1.2, p. 24) as one of Germany’s security interests: “It is not might but right that creates lasting peace and stability” (3.5, p. 52). Furthermore, it underlines the importance of systems of collective security such as the OSCE and the concept of common and human security. At the same time, however, “alliance solidarity” in the framework of NATO and the European Union is stated to be “a fundamental principle of German governance” (p. 49). It remains an unanswered question as to how German policy-makers would react if alliance solidarity with NATO or EU meant demanding certain security policy actions running counter to the maintenance of a “rules-based” international order. What would be the order of precedence accorded to alliance solidarity and the claims of the international legal order in the event of a conflict?
5. The Bundeswehr is primarily regarded as an “instrument of German security policy” (5.1). With this instrumental understanding we tend to lose sight of the viewpoints of people suffering violence and having to live and act in violent situations. War and conflict confront people with elementary and extreme threats – even traumas and death. Protestant peace ethics focuses on the accountability of political and military leaders for these aspects of military deployments.
The deployment of military force is always a sign of the failure of political action. Admittedly, the White Paper states that crisis prevention fundamentally takes precedence. However, there is no clear statement that the threat and use of military force can always only be the last resort. It does not tell us when, and in what cases, the threat and use of military force is justified as ultima ratio. There are no clear, guiding criteria for the use of military force. Such criteria are crucial, however, when it comes to political responsibility for sending people on missions that put at risk their mental and physical health, and even their lives.
6. The White Paper rightly recognises that arms build-up threatens the stability of the international peace order. This order is particularly precarious when new technologies are developed without being covered yet by the applicable arms control regimes. The White Paper supports an effective arms control and export policy, as well as the adapting of arms control regimes to technological progress (pp. 40-41). On the other hand, it calls for a strengthening of the German and European defence industry (p. 74) and advocates the export of “war weapons” to “third states” if “special foreign and security policy interests call for such measures in individual cases” (p. 75). It is unclear how this contradiction between a restrictive weapons export policy and the export of war weapons is to be resolved. Another question left unanswered is what kind of security policy interests would justify such an “individual case”. We gain the impression that German policies leave all options open for unhindered weapons exports. To avert this impression, Protestant peace ethics would propose setting out criteria on whether, and if so, when such weapons exports are justifiable.
7. It is pleasing to read that the 2016 White Paper is committed to the principles of Innere Führung with the ideal that soldiers are conscientious persons who take ethically considered decisions (p. 113f). However, there are no indications of what training models are suited to sharpening the soldiers’ consciences and equipping them with the basic principles for taking ethically balanced decisions. It would have been helpful to have included tips on existing successful models such as the above-mentioned course Education for Life.
8. The publication of the White Paper is intended to keep up the momentum of the broad debate that accompanied its drafting. The timing of the publication, however - during the parliamentary summer break - was not helpful to this concern for reception and discussion in parliament and society. From the angle of the EKD and Protestant peace ethics, it is important to continue this discussion now in a manner that is all the more intensive, committed and fruitful. We urgently need a debate in German society - extending beyond the security policy elites - about appropriate peace and security policies for the future. Such a debate should not just reflect on the insights of the White Paper on the future of the Bundeswehr but focus with no less intensity on the non-military instruments of German peace policy. The EKD will participate in this process with critical questions and constructive contributions.
PRESIDING PASTOR RENKE BRAHMS, PEACE SPOKESPERSON OF THE EKD COUNCIL BISHOP DR. SIGURD RINK, PROTESTANT BISHOP FOR PASTORAL CARE IN THE BUNDESWEHR